overturned Dr. Miles 3 , we might start our analysis of stare decisis from a point where the Court didn't overturn Dr. Miles, its 1984 decision in Monsanto. 4 Monsanto was the first of five antitrust cases decided during the Court's 1983 Term. 5 The Solicitor General had asked the Court to reconsider Dr. Miles in Monsanto, but in a footnote, the Court declined to do so. Justice Brennan's brief concurring opinion focused exclusively on the status of Dr. Miles. He emphasized the opinion's longevity-73 years at that point-and the fact that Congress had never enacted legislation to overrule Dr. Miles. 6 The 1983 Term is also interesting for the different ways that the cases approached stare decisis. In Jefferson Parish, the Court considered the law of tying, that is, the circumstances under which a seller forces a purchaser to take one product with a second product. 7 The question of whether or not to abandon the Court's prior rule that tying cases should receive per se treatment divided the Court. The five-member majority believed that it was "far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se'." 8 Court's prior per se treatment of tying. 10 But for Justice O'Connor and the other three justices joining her opinion concurring in the judgment, it was time "to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have." 11 But less than three months later, the Court took a different approach to stare decisis in antitrust. In Copperweld, 12 the Court considered the question of whether a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary were legally capable of conspiring under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Yes, the two were distinct legal entities and hence could contract with each other, but was that what Section 1 was looking for in its focus on "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade?" In a 5-3 decision, the Court concluded that the parent and the sub lacked sufficient separateness for Section 1 purposes. In so doing, the Court "disapproved and overruled" its prior decisions that were inconsistent with the rule announced in Copperweld. Which ones exactly was a point of dispute between the majority and the dissenters. In dissent, Justice Stevens counted at least seven decisions of the Court that he believed to be inconsistent with Copperweld 13 going as far back to 1947 (Yellow Cab). 14 The majority attempted to recharacterize most of the cases to suggest that they could have been decided on an alternative basis and to suggest that the issue had never been 10 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 32 ("Whatever merit the policy arguments against this longstanding construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the Act. In such circumstances, our practice usually has been to stand by a settled statutory interpretation and leave the task of modifying the statute's reach to Congress"). We should start with a basic conception of stare decisis and then work up from there. A minimalist approach to stare decisis might focus on almost a physical notion of repeatability: if the same inputs go into the same production system, the same output should result. Treat the Court as a thing unto itself; not something made up of a changing slate of nine individuals but instead as a coherent, integral entity. In that formulation, mere changes in Court personnel shouldn't change case outcomes. If the Court reaches a conclusion, if the same arguments are subsequently presented to a different 15 Copperweld, 467 US at 760 ("Although the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but perhaps one instance unnecessary to the result"). 16 We might think of stare decisis then as about the size of a required change necessary to reach a different result, where stare decisis might address either the non-court inputs to decisionmaking or the court process itself. The input version of stare decisis would focus on the required change in inputs that would permit the Court to change outcomes. A thin-version might mean that even small changes in inputs would cause the Court to change outcomes. So even weak new arguments or small changes in data would cause the Court to overrule a prior decision. A thick-input version of stare decisis would require much more substantial changes in circumstances before the Court would abandon prior positions.
A personnel-version of stare decisis might focus on voting rules for cases, which the Court might implement by adopting a supermajority decision rule for overruling prior cases. Don't overrule if the vote is only 5-4 in favor; instead, require greater unanimity than that. 18 To be mechanical about this, a 6-3 or better rule would mean February 13, 2008 Page 6 that a one-member change on the Court wouldn't by itself change results. A 5-4 case in one term couldn't become a 5-4 decision the other way if one of the original five justices were replaced by a new justice who held the opposite view of the question. The Court hasn't articulated stare decisis in this fashion. Instead, as Justice Breyer's dissent in Leegin emphasized, the Court has typically proceeded under a multi-factor approach. So the Court believes that stare decisis weighs more heavily when it construes statutes than when it reads the Constitution. 19 This is based on the view that, save for rare amendments to the Constitution, only the Court can change how the Constitution is applied, but Congress can rewrite statutes if the Court has misunderstood statutory text. Congress's knowing inaction then amounts to a type of silent ratification of the Court's interpretation of a particular statute.
That analysis dramatically overstates the ease with which Congress can overturn the Court's statutory interpretations. This isn't about the normal difficulties of getting legislation enacted in the U.S.-though those hurdles are genuine-but much more about the Court's power to select positions strategically and know that they won't be overturned. Take a simple example. Assume the relevant statute bears two natural interpretations. If the Court chooses one and both the House and the Senate disagree with the Court's choice, we should expect Congress to rewrite the statute. In contrast, if the Court chooses the interpretation favored by both chambers, Congress leaves the statute alone. This seems to be the framework that animates the Court's views on the importance of stare decisis in cases dealing with statutes.
But consider two other possibilities. The Senate and the House have different preferences over the two natural readings of the statute. The Court will choose one or the other, and whichever one the Court chooses, we will not see legislation overturning that choice. If the Court chooses the interpretation favored by the Senate, the Senate will block legislation overturning that choice, and both the Senate and the House must approve new legislation for it go forward. Alternatively, if the Court chose the House's favored interpretation, the House will block new legislation. In this simple situation-a statute with two natural readings-we have four possibilities. We will see responsive legislation in only one case-when the Court gets it "wrong" and the Senate and the House both disagree with that choice-but in the other three cases, we won't see new legislation. In only one of those situations should the Court infer acquiescence in the Court's read of the statute; in the other two cases, the two chambers don't agree and therefore can't agree to overturn the Court's interpretation. Note also that an especially strategic Congress wanting to send information to the Court might choose to pass confirmatory legislation in the case in which the Congress agrees with the Court's reading of the statute. Given the presumed agreement between the houses, it should be relatively costless to pass the confirming statute. The point of that legislation isn't to change the meaning of the text but to make clear that when the Court interprets statutory text and nothing issues from Congress, Congress disagrees internally over the meaning of the text. But if the Court chooses an interpretation and Congress is disabled from acting, what should the Court do in reconsidering the issue? For constitutional issues, Congress is disabled from acting by institutional design, as we have assigned the role of constitutional interpreter to the Court. In our two remaining cases, Congress is disabled from acting not by design but because of internal disagreement. By definition, that internal disagreement is just the opposite of acquiescence in the Court's view. One chamber favors one interpretation, the other the second, and that will be true regardless of which interpretation the Court chooses. Under those circumstances, the Court should give no special weight to that February 13, 2008 Page 9 disagreement in figuring out whether to reconsider its prior ruling but instead should rely on whatever general framework the Court brings to stare decisis. What does that mean for Leegin? In my view, the Court majority appropriately gave very little weight to Congress's changes to Section 1. Recall that Section 1 expanded in 1937 with the Miller-Tydings fair trade delegation to the states and then contracted in 1975 when Congress reclaimed federal authority under Section 1. But the Court didn't take that to somehow limit its ability to continue to evolve Section 1 antitrust doctrine, and it understood itself to have full authority to overturn Dr. Miles. That isn't to say that the Court was right to overturn Dr. Miles, as all I have done above is to sketch some general ways to frame stare decisis and I haven't offered a full theory of it, but it is to say that the fact that Dr. Miles interprets a statute shouldn't be given real weight in the stare decisis analysis.
I I . R u l e s f o r H o r i z o n t a l A g r e e m e n t s E s p e c i a l l y i n a V e r t i c a l C o n t e x t
We know that the set of activities that are treated as being per se illegal has shrunk over time. In some sense, antitrust doctrine has been riding a century-long roller coaster: we spent a great deal of time working our way up that large first hill and then we have rushed down from there. I am not sure where we would date the peak of the number of activities thought to be per se illegal, perhaps right before Sylvania.
I want to focus on horizontally-implemented vertical rules. That was a mouthful, so what do I mean by that? Take a series of questions posed by Justice Stevens during the Leegin oral argument. Leegin was represented by former Solicitor General Ted Olsen. Justice Stevens asked him: "Mr. Olson, suppose just the dealers in New York, the retail dealers agreed among themselves on the price. Would that be lawful?" Olsen demurred saying that as a horizontal agreement among retailers it would be per se unlawful. Justice Stevens persisted: "Why should that be any different from the arrangement where those A consumer is presented with a choice. On the left, is an object or stack of dollar bills worth $12; on the right is the same object, except the second object is worth only six dollars. The consumer is free to choose either object-either pie-and pays nothing. The consumer can have something either worth $12 or $6. This is supposed to be an easy choice. One of the first rules of economics is that more is better than less assuming we're talking about something that is good. So the consumer should take the $12 pie on the left. The pies are as before but the division associated with the first pie has changed. If the consumer chooses pie two, again paying nothing, the consumer receives an object were $6 as before. The first pie continues to be worth $12, but now when that pie is chosen, the consumer receives $4 and $8 goes to the producer. We again ask the consumer to choose between pie 1 and pie 2 and presumably our consumer chooses pie 2, again on the theory that more is better than less and that all are consumer cares about is her pocketbook. But this choice is socially inefficient meaning that society would be better off if the consumer chose the first pie. Economists typically start with the proposition that they are neutral about how pies are split; economists want more pie and leave to others the question of how to divide the pie. The first pie was bigger in Figure 1 and is also bigger in Figure 2 , but the division of value has changed, and now the private choice made by the consumer no longer maximizes social welfare. The change from Figure 2 to Figure 3 is that now the $6 pie when chosen channels $3 to the consumer and $3 to the producer. Which pie will our consumer choose and how do we evaluate that socially? In Figure 3 , if the consumer chooses pie 1, she receives $4, while if she chooses pie 2, she gets $3. Again on the principle that more beats less, we should expect the consumer to choose pie 1. As was the case in Figure 2 , we want the consumer to choose pie 1. Now the consumer does so and does so because more value is being channeled to the producer from pie 2 in Figure 3 -$3-than was the case for that pie in Figure 2 , where the producer received nothing.
This must seem like a long distance from the facts of Interstate Circuit, so let us see if we can head there. Consider a hypothetical involving a consumer who is choosing whether to see a movie today or six months from now. Recall that the agreement in Interstate Circuit was over the prices that would be charged at second-run movie theaters in Texas. Those were movie theaters that would receive a movie after had it already played in a first-run theater. Firstrun theaters understandably were concerned about the competition that second-run theaters posed. Competitors rarely want more competition, so the unhappiness of the first-run theaters shouldn't matter, unless something more interesting is going on. Back to our hypothetical consumer. She values seeing the movie today at $12 and six months from now at $6. That difference in value reflects the waiting costs of delay. That may be a standard preference for consumption today over tomorrow but also reflects in the case of things like movies and other culture objects that part of the consumption is a private consumption-me sitting at home watching the DVD on my television-and a second part is social consumption-me talking about the movie at work with colleagues. Movie watching in theaters is more naturally synchronized, DVD watching less so. Watching a movie six months later on DVD sacrifices much of the social consumption value.
The consumer movie values match the size of the pies we started with in Figures 1 through 3 . If the consumer could watch the movie for free, we would be back to Figure 1 and presumably the consumer would simply watch the movie today. But producers of movies typically charge for viewing them, so the consumer is actually facing a choice of 12 -p1-that being today's price for the movie-versus 6 -p2-the price of the movie six months from now. If we charge $8 for a movie today and nothing to see it tomorrow, then we now match Figure 2 . To get to Figure 3 , we need to live in a world in which the price of the movie today is $8 and the price six months from now is $3.
In this example, the movie version of Figure 2 might correspond to a world in which illegal downloading and copying of movies was easy; in that world, a consumer could count on being able to get the movie for free six months from now. In that case, the consumer would clearly wait to watch the movie, creating a social pie of $6 rather than paying to watch the movie today, which would create the social pie of $12. And note that assumes that the movie would be created; in a real example we would need to be concerned with ensuring that movie producers receive sufficient payment to create the movie in the first place. There is no movie to freely download illegally at date two if a movie is never created at date one. February 13, 2008 Page 14
Suppose we were in the world move version of Figure 2 . How should we feel about a mechanism which appeared which transformed Figure 2 into Figure 3 ? To be clear, this is a mechanism which somehow makes it possible for producers to gain a larger share of the pie in movie sales six months out. On the hypo, that might happen if we improved the enforcement of property rights in movies. But there are other alternatives, including the possibility of reducing competition between producers at stage two. In this example, doing so would be welfare enhancing.
Note that the hypothetical embraces an overall-welfare standard and not a narrow version of a consumer-welfare standard. If we just focused on consumer welfare, we would want to prevent the emergence of the stage two mechanism. Consumer welfare drops as we move from Figure 2 -where consumer welfare is $6 when the second pie is chosen-to Figure 3 , where it is $4 with the first pie is chosen in Figure 3 . The proper welfare measure is a controversial issue in antitrust, and I do not mean to address it here in detail. I find it hard not to think in overall welfare terms. Ultimately, individuals own corporate producers and we should attribute corporate profits to those individuals. Individuals should count, and not somehow just individuals as consumers. In any event, my focus here is on total welfare and, in this example, the new mechanism that splits the second pie in Figure 3 increases overall welfare. We might frame the question then as whether antitrust should care about the source of that mechanism if we can with confidence evaluate it directly. I understand this to be Justice Stevens's question at the Leegin oral argument. Minimum RPM is minimum RPM regardless of whether it is implemented horizontally by a group of local New York dealers or whether it is imposed one step up the vertical food chain by a manufacturer.
Take another step closer to the facts of Interstate Circuit. There is clearly a relationship between first-run and second-run movie markets. Sure there is a basic price competition between those markets but there are other spillovers that take place. If a first-run theater advertises the new blockbuster, that create creates demand for the second-run theater. That is easy to see if the theater markets are separated mainly by the income of the consumers. High-income consumers see movies today, while lower-income consumers wait to see them tomorrow. An ad when the movie comes attracts highincome consumers today to the first-run theater, but low-income consumers aren't going to see the movie today. But the initial ads create built-in demand six months down the road. Advertising might influence the willingness of those consumers see the movie at all, and if so, advertising by a first-run theater would create benefits for the second run theater. This is a standard free-riding issue and we might be that concerned that the spillover would lead to the underproduction of advertising, absent some sort of assurance for the first-run theater that they would recover sufficient fraction of the benefits of advertising. Now we might think in that situation that the movie studios would understand this and would have the incentive to internalize advertising across markets. They of course might do that by integrating vertically in the movie business, as indeed they once did prior to the antitrust decree in Paramount. But if we block vertical integration, then we might need some other mechanism to address competition between first-and second-run movie theaters. I don't see a reason to assume why the movie studios will necessarily have a better sense of what those mechanisms might look like than the theaters themselves.
We might be able to identify one or more classes of horizontal agreements fixing prices that we might think should be outside the per se rule of illegality. Justice Stevens hints that he might think that horizontally-implemented vertical rules might fall into that category. Obviously, merely suggesting that some horizontal price-fixing agreements might be useful isn't enough. The per se rule is a rule about most cases and a single example or a handful of examples may February 13, 2008 Page 16 still be insufficient. I don't know how many horizontal cases might be thought to fall within the class of horizontal agreements that should be evaluated under the rule of reason. I have never been quite sure what to make of Broadcast Music. 23 On one version of the case, it looks like broad horizontal activity. On another characterization, we emphasize that the blanket license is a new product and given that the access to the underlying compositions isn't exclusive, we might go beyond the rule of reason to regard the creation of the new product as wholly outside of Section 1. A raw focus on output might drive this: the new blanket license expands the opportunities available to consumers of performances-restaurants, radio stations and the like-and thus shouldn't be understood as a restraint on trade at all (again, conditioned on the nonexclusivity provisions of the license).
